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ABSTRACT Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) is an emerging coronavirus infecting humans that is
associated with acute pneumonia, occasional renal failure, and a highmortality rate and is considered a threat to public health.
The construction of a full-length infectious cDNA clone of the MERS-CoV genome in a bacterial artificial chromosome is re-
ported here, providing a reverse genetics system to study the molecular biology of the virus and to develop attenuated viruses as
vaccine candidates. Following transfection with the cDNA clone, infectious virus was rescued in both Vero A66 and Huh-7 cells.
Recombinant MERS-CoVs (rMERS-CoVs) lacking the accessory genes 3, 4a, 4b, and 5 were successfully rescued from cDNA
clones with these genes deleted. The mutant viruses presented growth kinetics similar to those of the wild-type virus, indicating
that accessory genes were not essential for MERS-CoV replication in cell cultures. In contrast, an engineered mutant virus lack-
ing the structural E protein (rMERS-CoV-E) was not successfully rescued, since viral infectivity was lost at early passages. In-
terestingly, the rMERS-CoV-E genome replicated after cDNA clone was transfected into cells. The infectious virus was rescued
and propagated in cells expressing the E protein in trans, indicating that this virus was replication competent and propagation
defective. Therefore, the rMERS-CoV-Emutant virus is potentially a safe and promising vaccine candidate to prevent MERS-
CoV infection.
IMPORTANCE Since the emergence of MERS-CoV in the Arabian Peninsula during the summer of 2012, it has already spread to
10 different countries, infecting around 94 persons and showing a mortality rate higher than 50%. This article describes the de-
velopment of the first reverse genetics system for MERS-CoV, based on the construction of an infectious cDNA clone inserted
into a bacterial artificial chromosome. Using this system, a collection of rMERS-CoV deletion mutants has been generated. Inter-
estingly, one of the mutants with the E gene deleted was a replication-competent, propagation-defective virus that could only be
grown in the laboratory by providing E protein in trans, whereas it would only survive a single virus infection cycle in vivo. This
virus constitutes a vaccine candidate that may represent a balance between safety and efficacy for the induction of mucosal im-
munity, which is needed to prevent MERS-CoV infection.
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A new coronavirus (CoV) emerged during the summer of 2012in Saudi Arabia (1–3). This virus has been named the Middle
East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) by the In-
ternational Coronavirus Study Group of the International Com-
mittee on Taxonomy of Viruses (ICTV) (4). Based on its genome
sequence, the virus has been classified within lineage C of the
genus Betacoronavirus. MERS-CoV is closely related to Tylonyc-
teris bat CoV HKU4 and Pipistrellus bat CoV HKU5, the two pro-
totype species in lineage C Betacoronavirus. MERS-CoV is even
closer in sequence to two CoVs found in bats circulating in the
Netherlands and Spain (5–7). Therefore, reemergence of the virus
in these and other European and Middle Eastern countries is a
realistic possibility. Using a nonhuman primate disease model
(rhesus macaques), it has been shown that Koch’s postulates can
be fulfilled (8).
MERS-CoV has been disseminated into 10 countries of the
Middle East, North Africa and Europe. The virus may have
crossed from bats to a domesticated or agricultural animal species
and subsequently spread from there into humans. To date, the
identities of both reservoir and intermediate hosts remain un-
known, complicating virus control efforts. Human-to-human
transmission has been documented in at least four independent
hospital settings (9–12). As of 7 August 2013, a total of 94 cases
have been confirmed, of which around 50% were fatal (http:
//www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/mers/index.html). This might be an
overestimation of the case fatality risk, as many infected patients
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likely have not required hospital assistance. In fact, recent data
suggest that mild respiratory illness might also be part of the clin-
ical spectrum of MERS-CoV infection (3). In addition to mild or
acute respiratory illness, other reported clinical symptoms are ab-
dominal pain and diarrhea, fever, and in some cases, renal failure
(9). Many hospitalized cases occurred in persons with chronic
underlying medical conditions or immunosuppression (3, 13).
The virus loads are highest in lower respiratory tract samples,
although low concentrations of viral RNA can also be found in
stool, urine, and blood samples (12).
The genome of MERS-CoV includes more than 30,100 nucle-
otides and contains at least 10 predicted open reading frames
(ORF1a, ORF1b, S, 3, 4a, 4b, 5, E, M, and N), 9 of which seem to be
expressed from a nested set of eight mRNAs (14, 15). Interestingly,
the partial genome sequences of three independent MERS-CoV
isolates reveal that it evolved following a strict molecular clock
model (6).
A functional receptor of MERS-CoV is dipeptidyl peptidase 4
(DPP-4) from both human and bat (16). This receptor binds to a
231-residue region in the spike (S) protein of MERS-CoV (17, 18),
a domain different from the receptor-binding site of other Beta-
coronaviruses (18). Infection of human airways by MERS-CoV
prevents the induction of interferon-regulating factor 3 (IRF-3)-
mediated antiviral alpha/beta interferon (IFN-/) responses.
However, MERS-CoV was markedly more sensitive to the antivi-
ral state established by ectopic IFN than severe acute respiratory
syndrome CoV (SARS-CoV) (14, 19, 20).
Soon after MERS-CoV emergence, a diagnostic assay was de-
signed (21). Similarly, antivirals inhibiting virus replication, such
as cyclosporine A, IFN-, or ribavirin, have been described (14,
22, 23). In contrast, reliable vaccines have not yet been developed,
although the S protein and the receptor-binding site within this
protein induce neutralizing antibodies and, in principle, could
serve as a subunit vaccine (17). CoVs infect respiratory and enteric
mucosal areas, and thus, induction of mucosal immunity is nec-
essary to protect these tissues from infection. Live attenuated vi-
ruses are expected to elicit mucosal immunity more efficiently
than nonreplicating antigens, which elicit reduced secretory im-
mune responses. Live attenuated viruses can be generated by the
deletion of genes conferring virulence, a procedure that requires
the availability of a reverse genetics system for MERS-CoV. In this
article, we describe the construction of an infectious cDNA clone
of MERS-CoV using a bacterial artificial chromosome (BAC). Us-
ing this clone, recombinant MERS-CoV (rMERS-CoV) deletion
mutants were constructed lacking genes nonessential for virus
replication. In addition, we deleted the structural envelope (E)
protein gene, because in previous work from our laboratory, de-
letion of the E gene in two other CoVs led to mutants that were
either replication-competent, propagation-defective viruses or at-
tenuated viruses (24–26). All deletion mutants efficiently repli-
cated and spread in cell cultures except the one in which the E gene
was deleted, which was replication competent but propagation
defective. This virus was propagated in cells by providing E pro-
tein in trans. Therefore, this deletion mutant missing the E gene
can serve as the basis for a safe vaccine candidate.
RESULTS
Construction of a MERS-CoV infectious cDNA clone as a BAC.
An infectious cDNA clone was assembled as a BAC under the
control of the cytomegalovirus (CMV) immediate-early pro-
moter, based on the genome sequence of the MERS-CoV-EMC12
strain (GenBank accession number JX869059) (15). To this end,
the same approach described for the generation of other CoV
infectious cDNA clones (27–30) was used. This system allows the
efficient intracellular production of viral RNA from the cDNA
clone without the need for in vitro ligation and transcription steps.
The BAC clone carrying the MERS-CoV infectious cDNA was
generated in several steps (Fig. 1). After selection of appropriate
restriction sites in the viral genome (Fig. 1A), the intermediate
plasmid pBAC-MERS-5=3= (Fig. 1B) was generated as the back-
bone to assemble the full-length cDNA clone. This plasmid con-
tained the first 811 nucleotides of the viral genome fused to the
CMV promoter, a multicloning site containing the restriction
sites selected in the first step (BamHI, StuI, SwaI, and PacI), and
the last 4,272 nucleotides of the genome, followed by a 25-
nucleotide (nt) poly(A) stretch, the hepatitis delta virus (HDV)
ribozyme, and the bovine growth hormone (BGH) termination
and polyadenylation sequences. Finally, the full-length MERS-
CoV infectious cDNA clone (pBAC-MERSFL) was assembled by
sequential cloning of four chemically synthesized overlapping
DNA fragments (MERS-1 to MERS-4) into the plasmid pBAC-
MERS-5=3= (Fig. 1C). The full-length clone sequence was identical
to that reported for the MERS-CoV-EMC12 strain (15), with the
exception of a silent point mutation (T to C) introduced in the
cDNA at position 20,761 (Fig. 1C). This mutation, which elimi-
nates an additional SwaI restriction site at position 20,760, was
introduced to facilitate the cloning process and was used as a ge-
netic marker to identify the virus recovered from the cDNA clone.
The assembled infectious cDNA clone was stable during its
propagation in Escherichia coli DH10B cells for more than 200
generations, as determined by restriction endonuclease analysis
(data not shown).
Rescue of infectious rMERS-CoV from the cDNA clone in
VeroA66 andHuh-7 cells. Infectious viruses were recovered from
the full-length cDNA clone, using susceptible Vero A66 and
Huh-7 cells, with titers of around 106 PFU/ml at 72 h posttrans-
fection (h.p.t.). The recovered viruses were cloned by three rounds
of plaque purification, and their phenotypic and genotypic prop-
erties were determined. Viruses rescued from both cell lines
(rMERS-CoV) induced a clear cytopathic effect (CPE), character-
ized by the induction of cell fusion, which was more apparent in
Huh-7 cells (Fig. 2). In addition, the replication of the rMERS-
CoV was confirmed by indirect immunofluorescence microscopy
using a nucleocapsid (N) protein-specific antibody, showing a cy-
toplasmic staining pattern in both cell lines (Fig. 2).
To further confirm the identity of the rMERS-CoV, the full-
length genome sequences of two independent clones rescued in
Vero A66 and Huh-7 cells were analyzed. The recombinant vi-
ruses rescued in Huh-7 cells presented the same sequence as the
cDNA clone, including the genetic marker at position 20,761.
However, in the case of the viruses rescued in Vero A66 cells,
several changes in the region of the accessory genes were detected
in both clones. One of them presented a deletion of 179 nucleo-
tides (from nucleotide 26,721 to 26,900) that disrupted gene 4b
and eliminated the transcription-regulating sequence (TRS) and
the first 20 amino acids of gene 5. The second clone presented a
1-base insertion at position 27,143 that changed the reading frame
and promoted the expression of a truncated gene 5. Taking these
data into consideration, two new virus clones rescued in Vero A66
cells were sequenced, and only one of them presented the wild-
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type sequence, suggesting that the MERS-CoV was more stable in
Huh-7 cells. Therefore, Huh-7 cells were selected for further work.
Rescue of infectious rMERS-CoVs lacking accessory genes 3,
4a and 4b, and 5. The availability of the pBAC-MERSFL infectious
clone opened the door to investigate the importance of accessory
genes 3, 4a, 4b, and 5 for MERS-CoV replication. To this end,
cDNA clones with genes 3 (pBAC-MERS-3), 4a and 4b (pBAC-
MERS-4ab), or 5 (pBAC-MERS-5) deleted were constructed
from pBAC-MERSFL (Fig. 3A). The expression of gene 3 was ab-
rogated by deletion of its TRS and coding sequence, with the ex-
ception of the 3= last 41 nucleotides, containing the 4a TRS, in
order to preserve the expression of gene 4a. In the case of genes 4a
and 4b, the majority of both coding sequences was deleted, except
for the last 81 nucleotides of gene 4b, which overlap the gene 5
TRS. Finally, the expression of gene 5 was avoided by deletion of
its TRS and complete coding sequence.
Infectious viruses were recovered in Huh-7 cells from plasmids
pBAC-MERS-3, pBAC-MERS-4ab, and pBAC-MERS-5 with
virus titers similar to that of the parental rMERS-CoV (around
106 PFU/ml). After one passage on fresh cell monolayers, the re-
combinant viruses were cloned by three plaque isolation steps and
their genetic structure was confirmed by sequencing. All the dele-
tion mutant viruses (rMERS-CoV-3, rMERS-CoV-4ab, and
rMERS-CoV-5) were identical to the parental virus (rMERS-
CoV) in terms of CPE and plaque morphology (data not shown).
The growth kinetics of these viruses were also similar, reaching
maximum virus titers at 72 h postinfection (h.p.i.) (Fig. 3B). In the
case of rMERS-CoV-4ab, the viral titer was around 10-fold lower
than that obtained from the parental virus (Fig. 3B). These data
indicated that the proteins encoded by genes 3, 4a, 4b, and 5 were
not essential for MERS-CoV replication in cell cultures.
Generation of a rMERS-CoVmutant lacking the structural E
protein gene. Based on published data showing that the deletion
of CoV E protein resulted in either replication-competent,
propagation-defective viruses (24) or attenuated viruses (25, 26,
31), a cDNA clone with the E gene deleted (pBAC-MERS-E) was
FIG 1 Assembly of a MERS-CoV full-length cDNA clone as a BAC. (A) Genome organization of the MERS-CoV-EMC12 strain. Viral genes (ORF 1a, ORF 1b,
S, 3, 4a, 4b, 5, E, M, and N) are illustrated by boxes in this genome scheme. The relevant restriction sites used for the assembly of the infectious cDNA clone and
their genomic positions (first nucleotide of the recognition sequence) are indicated. L, leader sequence; UTR, untranslated region; An, poly(A) tail. (B) Schematic
representation of pBAC-MERS-5=3=. Relevant restriction sites, the CMV transcription start, the HDV ribozyme (Rz), and the BGH termination and polyade-
nylation sequences (BGH) are shown. (C) Strategy to assemble the MERS-CoV infectious cDNA clone. Four overlapping DNA fragments (MERS-1 to MERS-4),
generated by chemical synthesis, were sequentially cloned into the plasmid pBAC-MERS-5=3= to generate the MERS-CoV infectious cDNA clone (pBAC-
MERSFL). Relevant restriction sites and the genetic marker (T to C) introduced at position 20,761 to abrogate the SwaI restriction site at position 20,760 are
indicated. Acronyms for viral genes and regulatory elements are as described for panels A and B.
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constructed from pBAC-MERSFL. The expression of the E gene
was abrogated by the deletion of its TRS and coding sequence,
with the exception of the 3= last 49 nucleotides, in order to pre-
serve the expression of gene M (Fig. 4A). To recover infectious
virus, BHK cells were transfected with pBAC-MERS-E or the
full-length cDNA clone pBAC-MERSFL. Six h.p.t. the transfected
cells were overlayed on Vero A66 cell monolayers, and at 72 h.p.t.,
the supernatants were harvested and serially passaged three times
on fresh Huh-7 cells. Infectious rMERS-CoV was recovered with
titers of around 106 PFU/ml, whereas visible plaques were not
detected for rMERS-CoV-E virus throughout these passages
(data not shown). Since CPE was observed at passages 0 and 1, the
cell supernatants from the different passages were titrated in
Huh-7 cells by limiting dilution. In contrast to the wild-type virus,
which was recovered with high titers (around 1 106 50% tissue
culture infection dose [TCID50]/ml), the rMERS-CoV-E was de-
tected only at passage 0 with apparent low titers (around 2 103
TCID50/ml) (Fig. 5A). This apparent low titer was most probably
due to the transfer of detached cells transfected with the pBAC-
MERS-E. These cells were taken with the supernatant used to
infect the next cell monolayer and formed syncytia with the non-
transfected cells, giving the impression of virus production. In
fact, rMERS-CoV-E virus was lost at subsequent passages in sev-
eral independent experiments performed in two different cell
lines, Vero A66 and Huh-7 cells (data not shown). The presence of
viral proteins was analyzed by immunofluorescence microscopy
in Huh-7 cells infected with either rMERS-CoV or rMERS-
CoV-E from passage 0. As expected, E protein was detected in
cells infected with rMERS-CoV but not in those infected with
rMERS-CoV-E (Fig. 4B). Viral N protein was detected in the
cytoplasm of both rMERS-CoV- and rMERS-CoV-E-infected
cells (Fig. 4B). Interestingly, whereas the N protein was detected
all over the cell monolayer in rMERS-CoV-infected cells, it was
only detected in small syncytia in cells infected with rMERS-CoV-
E. Altogether, these data suggested that E protein was required
for efficient virus propagation.
Complementation of rMERS-CoV-E in cells expressing E
protein in trans. Previous reports from our laboratory showed
that deletion of the transmissible gastroenteritis coronavirus
(TGEV) E gene leads to a propagation-defective virus that can
only spread from cell to cell by expression of the E protein in trans
(24, 32). To analyze whether rMERS-CoV-E could also be com-
plemented in cells transiently expressing E protein, the rescue of
rMERS-CoV-E and of rMERS-CoV as a control was analyzed in
Huh-7 cells that did not express E protein (E) and in cells tran-
siently expressing the E protein (E). The transfection efficiencies
in E cells varied between 40 and 50% in each independent exper-
iment. Infectious rMERS-CoV was rescued from both E and E
cells with virus titers of around 4  105 TCID50/ml and 1  106
TCID50/ml, respectively (Fig. 5A). In contrast, rMERS-CoV-E
was rescued in E cells with titers of around 1  103 TCID50/ml
but not in control E cells, in which the virus was not detectable
from passage 1 (limit of detection, 50 TCID50/ml) (Fig. 5A). These
data indicated that the E protein was necessary for either viral
RNA synthesis or virus propagation. To evaluate the role of the E
protein in viral RNA synthesis, the level of genomic RNA (gRNA)
was evaluated by quantitative reverse transcription-PCR (RT-
qPCR) at each passage. Viral gRNA was detected for rMERS-CoV
in both E- and E-expressing cells, as expected. However,
MERS-CoV-E viral RNA was detected at high levels in E cells at
passages 0, 1, 2, and 3, whereas it was only detected at similar levels
in E cells at passage 0, suggesting that MERS-CoV-E was a
replication-competent virus (Fig. 5B). To further confirm these
data, viral RNA synthesis was analyzed in a single-cycle infection.
E cells were infected with either rMERS-CoV or rMERS-
CoV-E grown in E cells. At 5 h.p.i., the levels of gRNA and
subgenomic mRNA 8 (sgmRNA N) were evaluated by RT-qPCR
(Fig. 6). Similar levels of gRNA and sgmRNA N were detected in
cells infected with both viruses, indicating that E protein was not
required for efficient viral replication and transcription. Overall,
these data indicated that rMERS-CoV-E was a replication-
competent, propagation-defective virus.
DISCUSSION
The emergence of MERS-CoV represents a public health threat
that requires further research to understand the virus biology and
FIG 2 Identification of the virus recovered from the cDNA clone. Vero A66 and Huh-7 cells were mock infected or infected with the rMERS-CoV rescued in
these cell lines at an MOI of 0.001 PFU/cell. The induction of syncytium formation (CPE) and N protein expression were analyzed 48 h.p.i. by light microscopy
and indirect immunofluorescence assay (IFA), respectively. Pictures were taken with a 40 objective.
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provide the basis for the development of control strategies. This
paper describes for the first time the construction of a reverse
genetics system for MERS-CoV, using BACs as vectors. The re-
combinant viruses described in this work were rescued using a
combination of synthetic biology and reverse genetics techniques,
as previously described for other CoVs (33). This system consti-
tutes a valuable molecular tool for the rational design and launch-
ing of attenuated viruses that may serve as efficient and safe vac-
cine candidates. In addition, the infectious cDNA clone will be
useful to study the role of specific viral genes in virus-host inter-
actions in the context of the complete viral cycle.
A full-length cDNA copy of MERS-CoV-EMC12 was gener-
ated from synthetic fragments cloned downstream from the CMV
promoter in a BAC. The BAC-based strategy allows the efficient
and reproducible intracellular production of viral RNA, since it is
first synthesized in the nucleus by the cellular RNA polymerase II
(Pol II) and then amplified in the cytoplasm by the viral replicase
encoded in the RNA itself (27, 28). The MERS-CoV infectious
cDNA was stably maintained in bacteria for more than 200 gen-
erations, allowing the easy and direct manipulation of the viral
cDNA for molecular studies. In addition, this BAC-based system
allows for the generation of viral replicons that may be used for the
screening of drugs affecting viral RNA synthesis (27, 34).
The full-length sequence of rMERS-CoV, recovered from the
infectious cDNA clone, was completely identical to that published
for the original MERS-CoV-EMC12 isolate (15), except for the
silent point mutation introduced as a genetic marker. Therefore,
both viruses should have the same biological properties. In fact,
the growth kinetics and CPE caused by both viruses were similar
when the same multiplicity of infection (MOI) was used to infect
Huh-7 cells (14).
Interestingly, the rMERS-CoV sequence seemed more stable in
Huh-7 cells than in Vero A66 cells. However, the data presented in
this article are statistically very limited to definitively conclude
that virus genome stability depends on the cell type used. Based on
the preliminary data presented here, it would be interesting to
analyze the evolution of the MERS-CoV sequence in different cell
types, including human respiratory epithelial cells.
The 3= third of the MERS-CoV genome contains a set of acces-
sory genes encoding proteins with no similarity to other viral or
FIG 3 Rescue and growth kinetics of rMERS-CoV deletion mutants. (A) Genetic structure of rMERS-CoV-3, rMERS-CoV-4ab, and rMERS-CoV-5
deletion mutants. TRSs and viral genes are depicted as boxes. The genomic positions of the deletions introduced (gray boxes) are indicated; the numbers
correspond to the last and first nondeleted nucleotide in each case. Acronyms for viral genes are as defined in the legend to Fig. 1. (B) Growth kinetics of the
deletion mutants. Huh-7 cells were infected at an MOI of 0.001 PFU/cell with rMERS-CoV-3, rMERS-CoV-4ab, rMERS-CoV-5, or the wild-type virus
(rMERS-CoV), and at the indicated times postinfection, virus titers were determined by plaque assay on Huh-7 cells. Error bars represent standard deviations of
the mean from three experiments.
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mammalian known proteins (35). In general, CoV accessory genes
are not essential for virus growth in vitro (36–39). The reverse
genetics system described in this article was used to study the
importance of these proteins in cell culture. MERS-CoV genes 3,
4a, 4b, and 5 were each found to be dispensable for virus replica-
tion in tissue cultures. Interestingly, some of the rMERS-CoV vi-
ruses recovered from Vero A66 cells contained mutations in the
accessory gene genome region that would prevent the expression
of any of these genes. Similar results were previously reported for
the original MERS-CoV-EMC12 isolate after passage in Vero cells
(15). These data suggested an apparent lack of selection pressure
on MERS-CoV accessory genes during passages in cell culture and
reinforced the dispensability of these genes for virus growth in
vitro.
Although not essential in tissue culture, these MERS-CoV ac-
cessory genes could have an important role in virus-host interac-
tion in vivo, leading to attenuated phenotypes. CoV accessory
genes have been associated with the modulation of viral virulence
(40). Among all CoVs, SARS-CoV contains the largest number of
accessory genes, and it has been proposed that these genes may
have important contributions to its high virulence (26, 39). To
date, mouse hepatitis virus (MHV) ns2 and 5a, TGEV 7, and
SARS-CoV 3b and 6 proteins have been implicated in the modu-
lation of innate immune responses, using different mechanisms to
influence virus virulence (36, 41–44).
rMERS-CoV-E was a replication-competent, propagation-
deficient virus and was only efficiently disseminated in cells ex-
pressing the E protein in trans. In the presence of transiently ex-
pressed E protein, rMERS-CoV-E yielded maximum progeny
viral titers of around 103 TCID50/ml. This modest yield could be
improved by the generation of cell lines stably expressing the E
protein. In fact, a direct relation between viral titers and the
amount of E protein expressed was previously observed for TGEV
(45). However, high expression levels of E protein could induce
apoptosis, as described for MHV E protein expression (46). To
overcome this potential adverse effect in the case of MERS-CoV,
an inducible system for E protein expression would have to be
established.
rMERS-CoV-E did not spread in cells in the absence of E
protein, thus constituting a single-cycle replicative virus. How-
ever, infected cells produced syncytia, which suggests good ex-
pression of viral S protein. In addition, high levels of N protein
were observed by immunofluorescence. These data suggested that
the high expression levels of viral proteins might serve as potent
immunogens to elicit a protective immune response. In the case of
SARS-CoV, it has been shown that nonreplicating SARS-CoV-like
particles bearing the E, S, and membrane (M) proteins induced
immune responses that were protective against SARS in mice (47,
48). In addition, SARS-CoV inactivated viruses induced adaptive
immunity that protected against challenge (49–52). The potential
of rMERS-CoV-E as a vaccine candidate is reinforced by previ-
ous observations indicating that a SARS-CoV lacking the E gene
(SARS-CoV-E) is attenuated and induces protection in ham-
sters, transgenic mice, and conventional aged mice (53–55).
MERS-CoV infects mucosal areas in the lungs and, probably,
the enteric tract. Mucosal immunity in a specific tissue, such as in
FIG 4 Rescue of rMERS-CoV-E. (A) Genetic structure of rMERS-CoV-E. TRSs and viral genes are illustrated as boxes. The genomic position of the
introduced deletion (gray box) is indicated; the numbers correspond to the last and first nondeleted nucleotides. Acronyms for viral genes are as defined in the
legend to Fig. 1. (B) Identification of the recovered viruses by immunofluorescence microscopy. Huh-7 cells were mock infected (MOCK) or infected with
rMERS-CoV-E and rMERS-CoV viruses from passage 0, and the expression of viral proteins E and N was analyzed 48 h.p.i. by immunofluorescence microscopy
using specific antibodies.
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lung infections with MERS-CoV, is optimally induced by local
stimulation. Therefore, immunization with live attenuated forms
of rMERS-CoV-E virus grown in a packaging cell line providing
the E protein in trans may be a convenient option, particularly in
comparison with purified MERS-CoV antigens, such as the S pro-
tein, that could serve as a subunit vaccine.
Vaccines based on live attenuated viruses may present bio-
safety problems associated with the possibility of reversion to vir-
ulent phenotypes or causing disease in immunocompromised in-
dividuals. In this sense, the use of rMERS-CoV-E would be a
safer option, as it does not propagate in the absence of E protein
expression, preventing straightforward reversion to virulence. To
increase the biosafety of a rMERS-CoV-E-based vaccine, addi-
tional safety guards could be included, such as the previously de-
scribed attenuating mutations in distant genomic locations, like
those encoding the nsp1 (56, 57) or nsp14 (58) replicase proteins,
or by introducing genomic rearrangements (59). Overall, we con-
sider rMERS-CoV-E a promising vaccine candidate that should
be further developed.
rMERS-CoV-E could also be used as the starting point to
generate an inactivated vaccine in case of an urgent need to con-
trol the disease. In order to guarantee the absence of virulent vi-
ruses after an incomplete chemical inactivation due to clump for-
mation, potential noninactivated viruses would be propagation
defective and, therefore, attenuated.
rMERS-CoV-E, in which one of the nonessential accessory
proteins was deleted, could be considered a marker vaccine, as it
will allow the sera of field-infected patients to be distinguished
from sera of vaccinated patients, based on the lack of antibodies
specific for nonessential viral proteins (60).
The rMERS-CoV-E could also be considered a viral replicon,
as its genome self amplifies in infected cells but infection is not
efficiently spread from cell to cell. The construction of a minimal
replicon is also possible with reduced effort using the infectious
clone, a project that is currently in progress in our laboratory.
Therefore, the introduction of a reporter gene, such as green flu-
orescent protein, within this replicon could easily generate a use-
ful tool for MERS-CoV antiviral drug screening.
In this paper, we describe for the first time a reverse genetics
system of MERS-CoV engineered on BACs, which has allowed the
generation of the first modified live vaccine candidate to protect
against MERS-CoV. Furthermore, this reverse genetics system is a
useful tool for the identification of viral genes involved in patho-
genesis and the associated signaling pathways. Drugs inhibiting
these pathways would be potential antivirals.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Cells and viruses. Baby hamster kidney cells (BHK-21) were obtained
from American Type Culture Collection (ATCC CCL-10). Human liver-
derived Huh-7 cells were kindly provided by R. Bartenschlager (Univer-
sity of Heidelberg, Germany). African green monkey kidney-derived Vero
A66 cells were kindly provided by A. Carvajal (University of Leon, Spain).
FIG 5 Rescue of rMERS-CoV-E in cells expressing E protein in trans. (A)
Virus rescue. After Huh-7 cells expressing (E) or not expressing (E) the E
protein in trans were transfected with plasmids pBAC-MERS-E and pBAC-
MERSFL, cell culture supernatants were serially passaged 3 times on fresh E
and E cells every 72 h.p.i., and the virus titers of the rescued rMERS-CoV
(WT) and rMERS-CoV-E (E) were determined by limiting dilution. The
black dashed line represents the detection threshold of the virus titration assay
(50 TCID50/ml). Error bars represent standard deviations of the means from
three experiments. (B) Viral gRNA analysis. The levels of viral gRNA in E and
E cells infected with either rMERS-CoV (WT) or rMERS-CoV-E (E) were
analyzed at each passage. Total RNA was extracted and analyzed by RT-qPCR.
gRNA levels were normalized by 18S rRNA levels. Error bars represent stan-
dard deviations of the means from three experiments.
FIG 6 Analysis of replication and transcription levels in rMERS-CoV-E-
infected cells. Huh-7 cells were infected with rMERS-CoV-E and rMERS-
CoV at an MOI of 0.001 TCDI50/ml, and at 5 h.p.i., the levels of gRNA and
sgmRNA N were evaluated by RT-qPCR. Both gRNA and sgmRNA N levels
were normalized by 18S rRNA levels. In addition, sgmRNA N levels were made
relative to gRNA levels. Error bars represent standard deviations of the means
from three experiments.
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In all cases, cells were grown in Dulbecco’s modified Eagle’s medium
(DMEM) supplemented with 25 mM HEPES, 1% nonessential amino
acids (Sigma), and 10% fetal bovine serum (FBS) (BioWhittaker). Virus
titrations were performed on Vero A66 or Huh-7 cells following standard
procedures and using closed flasks or plates sealed in plastic bags. For
plaque assays, infected cells were overlaid with DMEM containing 0.6%
low-melting agarose and 2% FBS, and at 72 h.p.i., cells were fixed with
10% formaldehyde and stained with crystal violet. For 50% tissue culture
infectious dose (TCID50) assays, CPE was recorded at 72 h.p.i. All work
with infectious virus was performed in biosafety level 3 facilities by per-
sonnel wearing positive-pressure air-purifying respirators (high-
efficiency particulate Air-Mate).
Plasmids andbacteria strains.Plasmid pBeloBAC11 (61), kindly pro-
vided by H. Shizuya (California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA),
was used to assemble the MERS-CoV infectious cDNA clone. This plas-
mid is a low-copy-number plasmid (one to two copies per cell) based on
the E. coli F factor (62) that allows the stable maintenance of large DNA
fragments in bacteria. E. coli DH10B (Gibco/BRL) cells were transformed
by electroporation using a MicroPulser unit (Bio-Rad) according to the
manufacturer’s instructions. BAC plasmid and recombinant BACs were
isolated and purified using a large-construct kit (Qiagen), following the
manufacturer’s specifications.
Construction of a full-length cDNA clone of MERS-CoV. Based on
the data of the full-length sequence of the MERS-CoV-EMC12 strain
(GenBank accession number JX869059) (15), a MERS-CoV infectious
cDNA clone was assembled in BAC using a three-step strategy. In the first
step, the restriction sites BamHI (genomic position 806), StuI (genomic
positions 7,620 and 9,072), SwaI (genomic position 20,898), and PacI
(genomic position 25,836), present in the viral genome, were selected
(Fig. 1A). Second, the intermediate plasmid pBAC-MERS-5=3= was con-
structed as the backbone for assembly of the full-length cDNA clone
(Fig. 1B). To generate this plasmid, two DNA fragments were generated
by chemical synthesis (Bio Basic, Inc.). The first fragment contained the
CMV promoter fused to the first 811 nucleotides of the viral genome
flanked by SfoI and BamHI sites, and the other one contained a multi-
cloning site with the restriction sites selected in the first step (BamHI, StuI,
SwaI, and PacI) followed by the last 4,272 nucleotides of the viral genome
joined to a 25-nt poly(A), HDV ribozyme, and BGH termination and
polyadenylation sequences. The first DNA fragment was cloned into
pBeloBAC11StuI (a pBeloBAC without the StuI restriction site) and di-
gested with SfoI and BamHI to generate the plasmid pBAC-MERS-5=, and
then the plasmid pBAC-MERS-5=3= was generated by cloning the second
DNA fragment, digested with BamHI and SfiI, into pBAC-MERS-5= di-
gested with the same restriction enzymes. Finally, the third step was the
assembly of the full-length cDNA clone (pBAC-MERSFL) by sequential
cloning of four overlapping DNA fragments (MERS-1 to MERS-4) into
the multicloning site of the intermediate plasmid pBAC-MERS-5=3=
(Fig. 1C). The overlapping DNA fragments flanked by the appropriate
restriction sites were generated by chemical synthesis (Bio Basic, Inc.). In
the case of fragment MERS-3, a silent mutation (T to C) was introduced at
position 20,761 in order to eliminate the SwaI restriction site at position
20,760 and to use it as a genetic marker. The genetic integrity of the cloned
DNAs was verified throughout the assembly process by extensive restric-
tion analysis and sequencing.
ConstructionofMERS-CoVcDNAclones lacking accessory genes 3,
4a, 4b, and 5. The deletion of gene 3 was generated by PCR-directed
mutagenesis using the plasmid pUC-MERS-1 (a pUC plasmid containing
the MERS-1 fragment spanning nucleotides 20,898 to 25,836 of the
MERS-CoV genome) as the template and the oligonucleotides MERS-S-
Tth111I-VS (5= TGCTATTTGACAAAGTCACTATAGCTGATC 3=,
where the restriction site Tth111I is underlined) and MERS-S-PacI-RS
(5= CCCTTAATTAACTGAGTAACCAACGTCAAAAAGATTCACACT
ATTAGTGAACATGAACCTTATGCGGCTCGAGGTCGTATTCC 3=,
where the restriction site PacI is underlined). The PCR product, including
the deletion (from nucleotides 25,518 to 25,803), was digested with
Tth111I and PacI and cloned into the same sites of pUC-MERS-1, leading
to pUC-MERS-1-3. To generate pBAC-MERS-3, the SwaI-PacI diges-
tion product from pUC-MERS-1-3 was cloned into the same restriction
sites of pBAC-MERSFL (Fig. 3A).
The deletions of genes 4a, 4b, and 5 were introduced by PCR-directed
mutagenesis, using as a template the plasmid pBAC-MERS-3= (a BAC
plasmid containing the MERS-3= fragment spanning nucleotides 25,836
to 30,107 of the MERS-CoV genome). For deletion of genes 4a and 4b,
overlapping PCR fragments were amplified using oligonucleotides
del4ab-VS (5= GAACTCTATGGATTACGGTTGTCTCCATACGGTC
3=) and del4ab-RS (5= GACCGTATGGAGACAACCGTAATCCATAGA
GTT 3=). The final PCR product was amplified with outer oligonucleo-
tides T7 and SA27201RS (5= CAAACAGTGGAATGTAGG 3=), digested
with PacI and NheI, and cloned into the same restriction sites of pBAC-
MERS-3=, leading to pBAC-MERS-3=-4ab that contains a deletion span-
ning nucleotides 25,862 to 26,751 of the MERS-CoV genome. For gene 5
deletion, a PCR fragment lacking gene 5 (nucleotides 26,835 to 27,513)
was amplified using oligonucleotides SA25834VS (5= GTTAATTAACGA
ACTCTATGGATTACG 3=, where the restriction site PacI is underlined)
and del5-SanDI-RS (5= CACGGGACCCATAGTAGCGCAGAGCTGCT
GTTAAAATCCTGGATG 3=, where the restriction site SanDI is under-
lined), digested with PacI and SanDI, and cloned in the same sites of
pBAC-MERS-3=, leading to pBAC-MERS-3=-5. To generate plasmids
pBAC-MERS-4ab and pBAC-MERS-5, the PacI-RsrII digestion prod-
ucts from plasmids pBAC-MERS-3=-4ab and pBAC-MERS-3=-5 were
cloned in the same sites of pBAC-MERSFL (Fig. 3A). All cloning steps were
checked by sequencing of the PCR fragments and cloning junctions.
Construction of a MERS-CoV cDNA clone lacking the structural E
gene. The pBAC-MERS-E, encoding a MERS-CoV lacking the E gene,
was constructed from the full-length plasmid pBAC-MERSFL. To this end,
the SanDI-RsrII DNA fragment (2,634 bp) from pBAC-MERSFL was ex-
changed with a chemically synthesized (Bio Basic, Inc.) SanDI-RsrII DNA
fragment with a deletion from nucleotides 27,580 to 27,786 that included
the TRS core sequence and the first 197 nucleotides of the E gene (Fig. 4A).
The genetic integrity of the cloned DNA was verified by restriction anal-
ysis and sequencing.
Recovery of recombinant viruses from the cDNA clones. To recover
infectious virus, BHK cells were grown to 95% confluence in a 12.5-cm2
flask and transfected with 6 g of the infectious cDNA clone using 18 g
of Lipofectamine 2000 (Invitrogen) according to the manufacturer’s spec-
ifications. At 6 h.p.t., cells were trypsinized, plated over a confluent mono-
layer of either Vero A66 or Huh-7 cells grown in a 12.5-cm2 flask, and
incubated at 37°C for 72 h. The cell supernatants were harvested and
passaged once on fresh cells, and the recovered viruses were cloned by
three rounds of plaque purification, following standard procedures.
Virus genome sequencing. The complete genome sequence of each
rescued recombinant MERS-CoV was determined by sequencing overlap-
ping RT-PCR fragments of 2.5 kb covering the full-length viral genome.
Reverse transcription and PCRs were performed with specific oligonucle-
otides using ThermoScript reverse transcriptase (Invitrogen) and the Ex-
pand high-fidelity PCR system (Roche), respectively, following the man-
ufacturers’ recommendations. The genomic 5=- and 3=-terminal
sequences were determined using the 5=/3= RACE (rapid amplification of
cDNA ends) kit (Roche) according to the manufacturer’s specifications.
Sequence assembly and comparison with the consensus sequence of the
MERS-CoV-EMC12 strain were performed with the SeqMan and MegA-
lign programs (Lasergene, Madison, WI).
Generation of Huh-7 cells expressingMERS-CoV E protein. For the
generation of Huh-7 cells transiently expressing E protein, cells were
nucleofected with the plasmid pcDNA3-E (expressing the MERS-CoV E
protein under the CMV promoter) by using a 4D Nucleofector device
(Lonza) and the buffer and program recommended by the manufacturer.
For the construction of plasmid pcDNA3-E, the E gene was amplified by
PCR using pBAC-MERSFL as the template and the specific oligonucleo-
tides E1-EcoRI-VS (5= GTGCTGGAATTCGCCGCCATGTTACCCTTT
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GTCCAAGAACGAA 3=, restriction site EcoRI is underlined) and E249-
XhoI-RS (5= CGCCCAGCTCGAGTTAAACCCACTCGTCAGGTGG 3=,
restriction site XhoI is underlined) and cloned into the plasmid pcDNA3
(Invitrogen) digested with EcoRI and XhoI.
Analysis of viralRNAsynthesisbyRT-qPCR.Total intracellular RNA
was extracted from transfected or infected cells with the RNeasy miniprep
kit (Qiagen) according to the manufacturer’s specifications. In the case of
transfected cells, the residual DNA was removed from samples by treating
7 g of each RNA with 20 U of DNase I (Roche) in 100 l for 30 min at
37°C, and DNA-free RNAs were repurified using the RNeasy miniprep kit
(Qiagen). Viral RNA synthesis was quantified by RT-qPCR. Total cDNA
was synthesized with random hexamers from 100 ng of total RNA using a
high-capacity cDNA reverse transcription kit (Invitrogen). Using this
cDNA, the viral RNA synthesis was analyzed using two custom TaqMan
assays specific for MERS-CoV gRNA (forward primer 5= GCACATCTGT
GGTTCTCCTCTCT 3=, reverse primer 5= AAGCCCAGGCCCTACTAT
TAGC 3=, and MGB probe 5= TGCTCCAACAGTTACAC 3=) and
sgmRNA N (forward primer 5= CTTCCCCTCGTTCTCTTGCA 3=, re-
verse primer 5= TCATTGTTATCGGCAAAGGAAA 3=, and MGB probe
5= CTTTGATTTTAACGAATCTC 3=). Data were acquired with an Ap-
plied Biosystems 7500 real-time PCR system and analyzed with ABI
PRISM 7500 software, version 2.0.5. The relative quantifications were
performed using the cycle threshold (2CT) method (63). To normalize
for differences in RNA sampling, the expression of eukaryotic 18S rRNA
was analyzed using a specific TaqMan gene expression assay
(Hs99999901_s1; Applied Biosystems).
Generation of polyclonal antisera specific for MERS-CoV N and E
proteins. Rabbit polyclonal antisera (pAb) specific for MERS-CoV N and
E proteins were purchased from BioGenes. In brief, peptides NTGRS-
VYVKFQDSKPPL (corresponding to E protein amino acids 60 to 76) and
AAAKNKMRHKRTST (N protein amino acids 244 to 257) were synthe-
sized and used to immunize two rabbits with each peptide according to
the company’s standard protocol. The polyclonal antisera obtained were
evaluated by enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA) using the syn-
thetic peptides, leading to titers ranging from 1:150,000 to 1:200,000 in all
cases.
Indirect immunofluorescence assay. Vero A66 and Huh-7 cells were
grown to 80% confluence on glass coverslips and infected with the recom-
binant MERS-CoVs. At 48 h.p.i., cells were fixed either with 4% parafor-
maldehyde in phosphate-buffered saline (PBS) at room temperature for
20 min or with methanol at 20°C for 15 min. For N protein immuno-
detection, paraformaldehyde-fixed cells were permeabilized with 0.2%
saponin in PBS containing 10% FBS for 20 min and incubated with
MERS-CoV N protein pAb (dilution 1:200) in PBS containing 10% FBS at
room temperature for 90 min. For E protein immunodetection,
methanol-fixed cells were incubated with MERS-CoV E protein pAb (di-
lution 1:500) in PBS containing 10% FBS overnight at 4°C. Coverslips
were washed 4 times with PBS and incubated at room temperature for
45 min with goat anti-rabbit antibody conjugated to Alexa Fluor 488
(Invitrogen) diluted 1:500 in PBS containing 10% FBS. Nuclei were
stained using DAPI (4=,6=-diamidino-2-phenylindole) (1:200, Sigma). To
fully inactivate the samples’ infectivity, methanol-fixed cells were treated
with 4% paraformaldehyde in PBS as described above. Finally, coverslips
were mounted in ProLong Gold antifade reagent (Invitrogen) and ana-
lyzed on a Leica SP5 confocal microscope. Images were acquired with the
same instrument settings and analyzed with Leica software.
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